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Chapter 1
Cybersecurity for the L-band Digital
Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)
Nils Mäurer1 Thomas Gräupl2 Corinna Schmitt3
Today’s analog voice-based air–ground communication system for tactical aircraft
guidance is suffering from the VHF band’s increasing saturation in high-density ar-
eas. The air–ground communication infrastructure is therefore undergoing digitisa-
tion to ensure the sustainable growth of the air transportation system in the coming
decades. As safety and security are strongly interrelated in aviation, strong cyber-
security is the foundation and enabler for digitalization in aviation. One of the new
air-ground datalinks that shall enable this transformation is the L-band Digital Aero-
nautical Communication System (LDACS). It will be the primary long-range terres-
trial datalink of the future IP-based aeronautical telecommunications network. In this
chapter we describe the design process, draft, and the state-of-the-art cybersecurity
architecture for LDACS.
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1.1 Introduction
Air Traffic Communications (ATC) is the backbone for safe and secure civil air traf-
fic enabling aerial transport of 4.5 billion passengers and 61.3 million tonnes uplift in
2019 [1]. Up to 2020 civil air traffic has been growing constantly at a compound rate
of 5.8% per year [2] and despite the severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, air
traffic growth is expected to resume very quickly in post-pandemic times [1, 3]. With
the growth of civil air traffic together with the increasing demand for data-requiring
digital services for aircraft guidance and the business operation of airlines, commu-
nication increases as well. To cope with this growth, Air Traffic Management (ATM)
systems must make more efficient use of its dedicated, limited spectrum making dig-
itization of ATM services unavoidable [4].
The entire industry is currently undergoing such a digital transformation and
one area that is mostly affected by this is Communication, Navigation and Surveil-
lance (CNS). The Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR)4 program in the
European Union (EU) and NextGEN5 in the US have been tasked with the develop-
ment of new technologies to create an aeronautical, digital Future Communications
Infrastructure (FCI). Candidates in the FCI are Aeronautical Mobile Airport Com-
munications System (AeroMACS) for airport communications (Airport (APT) and
Terminal Maneuvering Area (TMA) domain), SatCOM for Oceanic Remote Polar
(ORP)domains, and L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)
for long-range terrestrial aeronautical communications [5, 6]. LDACS will be the fo-
cus of this work. Fig. 1.1 shows the general structure for the FCI.
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Figure 1.1: The Future Communication
Infrastructure (FCI) with new data links
such as LDACS and AeroMACS [7, 8].
As safety and security are strongly
interrelated in aviation, strong cyber-
security is the foundation and enabler
for digitalization in aviation. The
World Economic Forum, the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), as well as the cybersecurity re-
search community agree with that [9,
10, 11, 12]. Unfortunately cyberse-
curity for CNS is still not realized in
most deployed systems [13, 14, 15, 16].
In part this is due to the requirements
for aeronautical datalinks, (1) low la-
tency and (2) low additional security
data overhead [17].
Another part is the difficulty and cost of implementing cybersecurity in a sys-
tem, once it has been designed, prototyped, released and possibly deployed. The
further down in that chain, the less likely and the more expensive it is to integrate
security measures. One excellent example is VHF Data Link mode 2 (VDLm2) [18].
VDLm2 is a digital datalink based on Very High Frequency (VHF). It was invented
4https://www.sesarju.eu/, Jan. 14, 2021
5https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/, Jan. 14, 2021
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in the 1990ies and provides a data rate of 31.5 kbps by using Differential 8 Phase
Shift Keying (D8PSK), Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) in the 118 MHz
to 137 MHz band [19]. Despite being around for decades, the requirement docu-
ments [20, 21] or specifications [22, 19] of the datalinks VHF or VDLm2 do not
fulfill any of the information security definitions of confidentiality, integrity, avail-
ability, authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation or reliability defined by RFC
4949 [23]. Even newer aeronautical information systems, such as Automatic Depen-
dent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B), a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
dependent surveillance technology used by aircraft to automatically broadcast their
GNSS based position, which is mandatory since 2020, is mainly known of its insecu-
rity [24, 25, 13, 26, 27] by information security standards. One of the few datalinks
in the aeronautical ecosystem, which has a dedicated cybersecurity architecture is the
FCI candidate for airport communications, AeroMACS. The system is majorly based
on the IEEE 802.16 WiMAX standard [7], which has a security sub-layer integrated
in its protocol stack. These selected examples show a clear picture: Information se-
curity or cybersecurity is still scarcely integrated into aeronautical communications.
In this chapter we describe the design process, draft and the state-of-the-art of
the cybersecurity architecture for the ground-based digital communications system
LDACS. LDACS has been designed with security in the mind, and shall introduce
state-of-the-art cybersecurity to aeronautics.
In Section 1.2, we introduce LDACS, relevant technical details and previous
work on the cybersecurity of LDACS. In Section 1.3, we list requirements and ob-
jectives for the cybersecurity architecture for LDACS, which we present in Section
1.4. For evaluation purposes, we evaluate the cybersecurity additions in a mathe-
matical model, a software simulation of LDACS and real flight trials in Section 1.5
before concluding in Section 1.6.
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1.2 Background on LDACS
LDACS is a ground-based digital communications system for flight guidance and
communications related to safety and regularity of flight [5, 6]. It has mainly been
developed in Europe and is currently under standardization by ICAO [28, 29].
1.2.1 System Characteristics
LDACS has its origin in merging parts of the B-VHF [30], B-AMC [31, 32], TIA-
902 (P34) [33], and WiMAX IEEE 802.16e technologies [34]. In 2007 the spectrum
for LDACS was allocated at the World Radio Conference (WRC), which is shown in
picture 1.2.
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Figure 1.2: Frequency assignment for
LDACS at WRC 2007, next to DME
It was decided to allocate the
spectrum next to Distance Measuring
Equipment (DME), resulting in an in-
lay approach between the DME chan-
nels for LDACS as illustrated in Figure
1.3.
Furthermore, LDACS uses 4G
technology to remain highly flexible
and scalable and efficient in coding,
supporting adaptive coding and modulation. Additionally, it applies Frequency Di-
vision Duplexing (FDD) because of the limited bandwidth available with the inlay
approach. Besides all these, LDACS supports seamless handovers, data and voice
transmissions, Quality of Service (QoS), has a navigation and surveillance exten-
sion, and an Air-to-Air (A2A) link is currently being developed.
1.2.2 Communication Functionality
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Figure 2.5. Block diagram of OFDM transmitter model.
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Figure 2.6. LDACS1 inlay deployment principle between two adjacent DME channels.
and the synchronization symbols are arranged into frames. The OFDM modulation
block comprises the steps summarized in the upper branch of Fig. 2.1.
2.3.2 Aspects of Inlay Approach
The inlay approach poses additional constraints on the design of OFDM systems.
In particular, the inlay system, i.e., the secondary system, has to be designed to
guarantee that the deleterious influence on primary systems is kept at an acceptable
level. On the other hand, the secondary OFDM system has to be able to work
properly, if exposed to interference from the primary system. How this can be
assured is explained in the following by analyzing the design of LDACS1.
Most parts of the aeronautical L-band are occupied by the DME system. It
works on a 1 MHz channel grid with a Gaussian shaped spectrum on each chan-
nel. Detailed DME signal characteristics are given in Section 3.3. In the LDACS1
inlay approach, the resulting gaps between adjacent DME channels are utilized by
LDACS1 channels with Beff ≈ 498 kHz. This approach implies that LDACS1 uses
also a 1 MHz channel grid, which is shifted by 0.5 MHz with respect to the DME
grid. The LDACS1 inlay deployment approach is depicted in Fig. 2.6.
Power
LDACS
Figure 1.3: Inlay approach for LDACS in
between the DME bursts
LDACS was especially designed for
ATC and ATM applications like Con-
troller–Pilot Data Link Communica-
tions (CPDLC), Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Contract (ADS-C), full
4D trajectories exchange and real-time
weather information such as the Graph-
ical Weather Service (WXGRAPH). It
is envisioned that Ground Based Aug-
mentation System (GBAS) functional-
ity will be also be provided via LDACS
in the future as well [35, 36]. The
underlying enabler for all those ap-
plications are the main LDACS pa-
rameters listed in Table 1.1. Thus,
LDACS covers current Air Traffic Ser-
vices (ATS), Aeronautical Operati nal
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Control (AOC) data and also future applications, enables new concepts (e.g., sector-
less ATM) and has at least an order of magnitude more net capacity than the currently
used terrestrial links like the VDLm2 system [29].
Table 1.1: Main parameters for LDACS
Number of sub carri-
ers
64 (50 used)
Bandwidth 625 / 488 kHz
Subcarrier spacing 9.765625 kHz
OFDM symbol dura-
tion
102.4 µ
Guard interval (4.8 + 12.8) µ
Net data rate 470 kbits - 2.82
Mbit/s
The latest extension of
LDACS communications capa-
bilities – A/A communication
– is researched in the Ger-
man national project IntAir-
Net [6]. The goal is to
establish direct A/A commu-
nications between aircraft in
communication range allowing
infrastructure-less aeronautical
network for ad-hoc networks
between aircraft. However, this
research is only at an early
stage, thus we will focus solely
on the LDACS A/G link.
1.2.3 LDACS Network Entities
Fig. 1.4 depicts involved components and communication links.
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Figure 1.4: Network architecture of LDACS [37]
Up to 512 Aircraft Station (AS) communicate to an LDACS Ground Station
(GS) in the Reverse Link (RL). GS communicate to AS in the Foward Link (FL). GSs
are controlled by a Ground Station Controller (GSC). The GSC connects the LDACS
sub-network to the global Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) to which
the corresponding Air Traffic Services (ATS) and Aeronautical Operational Control
(AOC) end systems are attached.
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1.2.4 LDACS Protocol Stack
For AS and GS, we can identify different layers and entities in the LDACS proto-
col stack namely Physical Layer (PHY), Medium Access Layer (MAC), Data Link
Service (DLS), LDACS Management Entity (LME), Voice Interface (VI) and Sub-
Network Protocol (SNP) and for the GSC, we identify the LME, as illustrated in
figure 1.5.
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Figure 1.5: The LDACS sublayer is embedded in the FCI (IPv6, voice and control
traffic) and consists of Physical layer (PHY), Medium Access Layer (MAC), Data
Link Service layer (DLS) and Voice Interface (VI), both located in the logical link
control sublayer and finally the Sub-Network Protocol layer (SNP). The LDACS
Management Entity (LME) serves as a cross layer entity between MAC, DLS and
SNP layer and is the single LDACS relevant entity in the GSC. Voice data is trans-
mitted to higher layers via the Airborne Voice Interface (AVI) on AS side and Voice
Unit (VU) on GS side. Data is passed to higher layers via the Airborne Network
Interface (ANI) in the AS and via the Access-Router (AC-R) in the GS.
The physical layer provides the means to transfer data over the radio channel
(R1 interface). The LDACS ground-station supports bidirectional links to multiple
aircraft under its control. The forward link direction (ground-to-air) and the reverse
link direction (air-to-ground) are separated by FDD. Forward link and reverse link
use a 500 kHz channel each. The ground-station transmits a continuous stream of
Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) symbols on the forward link.
In the reverse link different aircraft are separated in time and frequency using a com-
bination of Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) and Time
Division Multiple Access (TDMA). Aircraft thus transmit discontinuously on the
reverse link with radio bursts sent in precisely defined transmission opportunities
allocated by the ground-station [17].
The data-link layer provides the necessary protocols to facilitate concurrent and
reliable data transfer for multiple users. The LDACS data link layer is organized
in two sub-layers: The MAC sub-layer and the Logical Link Control (LLC) sub-
layer. The MAC sub-layer manages the organization of transmission opportunities in
slots of time and frequency. The logical link control sub-layer provides reliable and
acknowledged point-to-point logical channels between the aircraft and the ground-
station using an automatic repeat request protocol.
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Within the LDACS data link layer two entities are of special interest to us: The
LDACS Management Entity (LME) and the Sub-Network Protocol (SNP).
The main task of the LME is to perform configuration, resource management
and mobility management of LDACS. The mobility management service in the LME
provides support for registration and de-registration (cell entry and cell exit of air-
craft), scanning channels of neighboring cells and handover between cells. It also
manages the addressing of aircraft within cells. The resource management service
is responsible for link maintenance (power, frequency and time adjustments). In
Fig. 1.5, we see that that these functionalities are provided from within the LME via
the ”Radio Link Function”, while user data and communications to the SNP is man-
aged via the ”Sub-Net Functions”. The SNP glues the LDACS network together and
works as a connector to the network layer. It provides end-to-end user plane and con-
trol connectivity between the aircraft, ground-station and ground-station controller
within the LDACS sub-network.
1.2.5 Interfaces, Data Flow and Logical Channels
LDACS internal control data is exchanged between AS and GS over the radio link
(R1) and up within the protocol stacks via Common Control (CC) and Dedicated
Control (DC) slots between PHY and MAC, Common Control Channel (CCCH)
and Dedicated Control Channel (DCCH) logical control channels between MAC and
LME. Thus all critical LDACS control functions are handled by the LME.
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Figure 1.6: Overview of LDACS logical
channels for user data (DCH) and control
data (BCCH, RACH, CCCH, DCCH) [29]
User data is depicted in black in
Fig. 1.5 and travels from ground based
Aeronautical Network Service Provider
(ANSP) or airline servers via the AC-
R over the G1/G2 link into the SNP.
The DLS offers different Classes of
Service (CoS), depending on the pri-
ority of the user packet and via these
(DLS CoS 0...5) into the DLS. Be-
tween DLS and MAC, the Data Chan-
nel (DCH) logical channels transports
user data to the lower layer and via the
DATA interface on slot level, user data
is handed down from the MAC to PHY layer. Between AS and GS, user data is
transmitted then via the radio link (R1), before it is received and handed up between
the different protocol layers in the AS, before being handed up to the ANI via the
A1 interface. In Fig. 1.6, we see the corresponding control channels, with a deeper
description of user (DCH) and control channels (RACH, BCCH, CCCH, DCCH)
following below:
FL Data Channel (DCH) As the FL channel is held in continuous OFDM trans-
mission, dedicated for the deliverance of user data, the GS locally allocates FL
channel resources (i.e. FL PHY-SDUs) within slots and manages the access
priorities.
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RL Data Channel (DCH) In contrast to the FL DCH, RL DCH uses a bandwidth
on demand scheme. Each AS has to request channel resources (RL PHY-SDUs)
from the GS before they can send any user or control data in the RL data chan-
nel.
Data Control Channel (DCCH) The DCCH is used in RL only, by any AS to con-
vey MAC/Logical Link Layer (LLC) control messages to the GS, while each
AS has its own DCCH so that none other than this specific aircraft can send on
that channel.
Common Control Channel (CCCH) The CCCH is used in FL only and only by
one GS in order to announce e.g. the MAC slot layout and to perform resource
allocation in the FL/RL to the AS. Also the GS may send control messages on
this channel.
Random Access Channel (RACH) The RACH’s purpose is predominantly for AS
to make cell entry requests. Only AS may use it.
Broadcast Control Channel (BCCH) As in the name, cell configuration informa-
tion and mobility management commands are sent to the AS via broadcast mes-
sages. Only the GS can use it and it reaches all aircraft listening to the same
broadcast Subscriber Access Code (SAC).
1.2.6 LDACS Frame Structure
In the FL direction, each Super Frame (SF) starts with a Broadcast Channel (BC)
slot, where the GS announces its existence to the AS and sends physical parameters
for link establishment. The rest of the FL SF is split into four Multi Frame (MF),
each containing nine OFDM frames and each frame comprises three FL Physical
Layer-Service Data Unit (PHY-SDU). Every FL PHY-SDU can be used to transmit
FL user data or CC data, in which GS can allocate resources to an AS. Details about
the LDACS frame structure are depicted in Fig. 1.7.
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
Time
RL Data
variable
CC FL Data
Variable
FL Data
FL PHY-SDU
RL DC PHY-SDU
21
1
2
2
7
RA
Multi-Frame 1 
(58.32 ms)
Multi-Frame 2 
(58.32 ms)
Multi-Frame 3 
(58.32 ms)
Multi-Frame 4 
(58.32 ms)
RA1 RA2
6.72 ms
56 OFDM 
symbols
Super-Frame (240 ms)
2000 OFDM symbols
BC
BC
Multi-Frame 1 
(58.32 ms)
Multi-Frame 2 
(58.32 ms)
Multi-Frame 3 
(58.32 ms)
Multi-Frame 4 
(58.32 ms)
RL
FL
58.32 ms - 486 OFDM symbols
6.48 ms
54 OFDM symbols
1 OFMD frame
3 FL PHY-PDUs
3
= 1 tile
0.72 ms
6 OFDM symbols
RL PHY-SDU
1 3
1
1
602 DC
1
59
2 RA frames
3 BC frames
= 1 tile
0.72 ms
6 OFDM symbols
Figure 1.7: Frame structure of LDACS [29]
In the RL, a SF starts with a Random Access (RA) slot, where AS can request
access to an LDACS cell, and continues with four MFs. Each RL MF is constructed
from 162 RL PHY-SDU equivalent to OFDMA tiles. They are used for two purposes,
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namely (1) to transmit DC data, which are used by an AS to request the allocation
for resources allowing them to send on the RL and (2) to transmit RL user data.
1.2.7 LDACS Cell Entry Procedure
Once a GS is securely connected to the aeronautical ground network via the GSC, it
starts sending a broadcast message, the System Identificaiton Broadcast (SIB) mes-
sage, containing relevant information such as network identification, physical param-
eters such as channel frequencies and more. When an AS enters the cell served by a
GS, it receives the SIB and sends a CELL RQST message in reply. The CELL RQST
message contains a ”unique address identifying the LDACS radio” [29]. When the
GS receives the CELL RQST message, a CELL RESP message is sent back to the
AS, informing the AS about its System Area Code (SAC). The SAC is a local and
temporary address for the AS in the cell. After this exchange of control channel mes-
sages, both communication parties are informed about LDACS specific addresses,
timing, frequency, and power values and can start the user data communication.
1.2.8 LDACS Data Rate
Data is transported in the DCH via different FL PHY-SDUs and RL PHY-SDUs of
different sizes. Depending on coding and modulation, thus the channel quality, the
FL PHY-SDUs sizes range from 728 to 3296 Bit, and the RL PHY-SDUs range from
112 to 528 Bit. With 27 frames per MF in total and one to eight FL PHY-SDUs being
reserved on the Flight Level (FL) for the Common Control messages, this leaves 19
to 26 FL PHY-SDUs per MF for data transport. The minimum amount of Bit per MF
can thus be calculated with 19∗728 = 13,832 Bit and the maximum Bit per MF with
26 ∗ 3296 = 85,696 Bit. On the reverse link, the RL PHY-SDUs are separated into
162 tiles. The first two tiles are sync tiles, followed by a minimum of two DC and
a maximum of 32 DC tiles, which limits the minimum usable user data per MF to
(162−2−32)∗112 = 14,336 Bit and allows a maximum of (162−2−2)∗528 =
83,424 Bit per MF [29].
This is equivalent to a minimum data rate of 230.5 kbit/s on the FL and 238.9
kbit/s on the RL, with maximum control channel use. Respectively, the maximum
data rate is 1428.3 kbit/s on the FL and 1390 kbit/s on the RL, with minimum control
channel use.
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1.3 Security Requirements, Objectives and Functions
In previous works [38, 17, 37], several threat and risk analysis were performed result-
ing in the identification of assets, threats and corresponding security requirements,
objectives and functions. LDACS must follow the same protection goals as any other
aeronautical datalink within the FCI. These are [39, 11]:
Safety The system must sufficiently mitigate attacks, which contribute to safety
hazards.
Flight regularity The system must sufficiently mitigate attacks, which con-
tribute to delays, diversions, or cancellations of flights.
Protection of business interests The system must sufficiently mitigate attacks
which result in financial loss, reputation damage, disclosure of sensitive proprietary
information, or disclosure of personal information.
The next step was to identify assets and objectives: Anything that someone
places value upon is regarded as asset. For LDACS five assets were identified: (1)
hardware, (2) software, (3) link, (4) data, and (5) services [11].
LDACS Hardware It is responsible for the execution of LDACS software, pro-
viding relevant functionality (i.e., supporting any of LDACS possible CNS services).
Furthermore LDACS relevant information is stored on it. LDACS hardware refers
to AS, GS, and GSC but also to an Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
(AAA) server, e.g., integrated within the GSC, Access Routers, the links between
entities and the respective LDACS specific internal and shared network and routers.
LDACS Software It enables LDACS CNS capabilities. Thus, we need to make
sure that a software component of the devices or sub system is not corrupt, has no
errors or other defects. Also we have to prevent wrong installation or configuration
of the software components.
LDACS Radio Link All required radio links, accurate time synchronization
along with LDACS control data and radio communications connections enabling
LDACS to transmit send and receive data via that link are assets. Most important
here is preventing unauthorized access, altered hardware, eavesdropping, jamming
and spoofing. However, we will not introduce hardware protection mechanisms,
such as regular quality checks, access limitations to special hardware and control of
personal working on that hardware, or physical layer robustness mechanisms, such as
frequency hopping, pilot symbol scrambling, but rather focus on providing protocol
based security from the MAC layer up.
LDACS Data All data, relevant for an error-free execution of LDACS services
are an asset. These include (but are not limited to) (1) identities of communication
entities, (2) LDACS control data, (3) user data, (4) confidential data, only accessible
for legitimate users and entities only, (5) any cryptographic material, (6) configura-
tion data or (7) data relevant for navigation services.
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LDACS Services Several services, such as system management, announcement
and routing, mobility and authentication service are required for an operational base-
line for LDACS. As use case, at least 21 high critical ATS user data services and 14
high critical AOC data services [38, 37] were identified to be provided by LDACS.
As new functions in ATS and AOC services can be introduced on a frequent basis,
this work can only contribute to highlighting already existing safety relevant services
in regard to LDACS. Examples of them are the ATC Clearance (ACL), Data Link
Logon (DLL), Flight Plan Consistency (FLIPCY), Flight Plan Data (FLTPLAN),
Network Connection NETCONN or Network Keep Alive NETKEEP service.
This analysis lead to the identification of five security objectives for LDACS in
[17], which were extended to nine objectives in the official LDACS Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPS) [40]. These are (1) to protect availability and
continuity of service, to protect (2) integrity, (3) authenticity for user and control
plane messages in transit, (4) provide non-repudiation of origin, (5) confidentiality
for user plane messages in transit, (6) mutual entity authentication, (7) authorize
explicitly permitted actions of users or entities, (8) prevent the propagation of intru-
sions within LDACS domains and towards external domains and (9) protect against
service attacks to a level consistent with the application service requirements.
With these guidelines and objectives in mind, security functions were defined in
[41, 11], following the definitions from RFC 4949 [23].
Entity Authentication We need to integrate functions for mutual entity identifi-
cation, authentication authorization and accounting for every participant within the
LDACS sub-net, thus preventing any un-authorized access or use of LDACS.
Key Management LDACS shall include functions for secure key generation,
key agreement, key derivation, key access and key destruction.
(User) Data Confidentiality We suggest using strong symmetric encryption for
user data encryption, due to low computational overhead and fast operation times.
After a master key has been negotiated between each communicating party and an
encryption key derived from it, incoming user messages from the air traffic network
can be encrypted.
Data Integrity As several threat-and-risk analysis for LDACS revealed, data-
in-transit integrity is one of the most important security property for wireless com-
munications systems [38, 17, 37], as due to the wireless nature of the communication
medium, it is inherently easy to eavesdrop on messages, modify or delete them.
Data Origin Authentication Some data on the link, such as entity authentica-
tion related data, shall include a data origin proof.
System Integrity Self-checks and checks at startup of systems/devices of LDACS
shall detect manipulation or errors in behavior of the security mechanisms.
Robustness LDACS shall support functions ensuring reliability and robustness
to mitigate jamming, spoofing, interference or DoS attacks.
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Secure Logging Mechanisms for security and non-security relevant logging, to-
gether with regular checks and possibly including the digital signature of the logging
device, ensures secure logging of actions within the LDACS radio devices.
Physical Access LDACS shall provide physical security commensurate to the
data it contains. This includes zeroing out keys and other secret data in emergency
cases.
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1.4 A comprehensive Cybersecurity Architecture for LDACS
In this chapter, we combine the inner workings of LDACS from Section 1.2 and cy-
bersecurity requirements and functions from Section 1.3 together to present a com-
prehensive cybersecurity architecture for LDACS.
1.4.1 Placements of Security Functionality in Protocol Stack
In [17, 37, 41] suitable placement of security functionality within the LDACS proto-
col stack was discussed.
We argue that placing protection mechanisms in the LME and SNP entities
within the protocol stack will be most efficient in securing LDACS. MAC and DLS
will also receive new tasks (e.g., measures for control channel protection). Security
endpoints for secure user data communication and primary entity authentication are
the AS and GSC, while the control data plane will be protected between GS and
AS. Lastly, GSC and GS will establish a secure connection, prior to any aircraft be-
ing able to successfully connecting to the LDACS network. With these measures
we can achieve user plane end-to-end security from GSC to AS, provide entity au-
thentication among all parties and introduce key negotiation and derivation functions
between relevant parties.
1.4.2 Trust
The LDACS security concept requires all entities in an LDACS network to authen-
ticate to each other to ascertain that only trusted participants can use the system. To
establish trust within the network, there are multiple ways to achieve this:
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
The general idea of a PKI is the attempt to solve the problem of having to trust a
communication’s partner identity claim.
Region 1
CA
Region 2
CA
Region 3
CA
Region 4
CA
Region 5
CA
Region 6
CA
Figure 1.8: Worldwide aeronauti-
cal PKI - cross certification [7, 8]
A PKI can solve this problem via involving
a trusted third party who verifies the identities
of the parties who wish to engage in communi-
cation via issuing a digital certificate.
The most commonly used digital certifi-
cates are X.509 [42] certificates, which contain
(1) the issuing Certificate Authority (CA), the
(2) CA digital signature, (3) version number,
(4) serial number, (5) owner, (6) owner’s pub-
lic key, (7) validity period, (8) certificate usage
and (9) signature algorithm. As aviation op-
erates worldwide, a hierarchical PKI will have
to be deployed with several sub-CAs being dis-
tributed over the world.
Basically there are two proposals on how to
achieve worldwide trust coverage [43]:
“output” — 2021/6/10 — 12:41 — page 14 — #14
14 Aviation Cybersecurity
Region 1
CA
Region 2
CA
Region 3
CA
Region 4
CA
Region 5
CA
Region 6
CA
ICAO Bridge
Figure 1.9: Worldwide aeronauti-
cal PKI - ICAO trust bridge
One root CA is installed per geographic
region and then it performs cross-certification
with distributed root-CAs of all other geo-
graphic regions around the world. Subdomains
can exist within ATM organisations. Here trust
emerges from the assured trustworthiness of
each regional root CA cross-certifying other
and being cross-certified by other regional CAs.
This approach is depicted in Fig 1.8.
The other idea is to have one worldwide (probably offline) root CA, hosted by
a trusted worldwide entity, such as ICAO, with several regions sub-CAs distributed
around the world. That way, the ICAO hosted root CA serves as trust bridge, as
seen in Fig 1.9. However, a PKI comes with some drawbacks for digital aeronautical
communications:
1. Massive rollout, management, and revocation of certificates are required.
2. A root of trust has to be declared and accepted by state actors worldwide po-
tentially requiring secure cross certification among all countries worldwide re-
specting political situations and regulations in aviation. Thus, the infrastructure
must map to the political reality of aviation which is, that a small number of state
actors capable of securing critical infrastructure with limited trust towards the
outside. All this makes a PKI possibly not the best solution for a aeronautical
trust framework.
With the two drawbacks mentioned PKI may be a challenging solution for an
aeronautical trust framework. But keeping in mind that digital data links for civil
aeronautical traffic (i.e. AeroMACS) use a PKI as their trust solution [44], it looks
promising to use PKI also for LDACS.
The advantage of this way forward is the possible alignment of the LDACS PKI
concept with the AeroMACS PKI [44], which is already realised and operational.
Furthermore all entities within the FCI should remain interoperable, providing a
seamless multi-link concept for aeronautical data, which makes the PKI based trust
solutions the most likely one.
Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) Challenge-Response Pair (CRP)
The concept of Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) based trust lies within the prop-
erty of unclonability of PUFs and thus the uniqueness of PUFs. Hence, a PUF can
be interpreted as a unique device’s fingerprint, an enabler to create a unique set of
CR pairs and a strong random number generator. With a secure database on ground
where Challenge Response Pairs (CRP) are stored (and possibly unique per authen-
tication round) a MAKE scheme can be established and trust incorporated into the
system based on the trust placed unto the first transmission of CRP and secrecy of
CRP. However, the PUFs would have to be installed within the radio hardware during
a secure manufacturing process.
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1.4.3 Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange (MAKE)
Depending on the method how trust is incorporated into the system there are differ-
ent approaches for Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange (MAKE) procedures.
Overall all procedures need to fulfill the following three objectives:
Mutual Authentication: Both parties can be sure of the identity of the other
and that both actually participated in this interaction.
Secure Key Agreement: Both parties have established a shared session key,
which means both parties know this key and know that they can use it for a secure
communication with the other party for the duration of this session. The key must
have never been used before in a session and only the two parties can know it.
Perfect Forward Secrecy: The established session key remains secret, even
when the private signing keys of the involved parties have been compromised after
this session.
1.4.3.1 Station-to-Station (STS)-MAKE
The origin of LDACS mutual authentication and key exchange protocol, first men-
tioned in [41], is a variation of the STS protocol [45]. Since the publication of [41],
we investigated different STS variants and protocol 5.25 ”Modified STS protocol”
in [45] proves to be more secure and concise than that mentioned in [41]. It pre-
vents the possibility of a Man-in-the-Middle attack during the exchange of the key
material by signing the respective material with the help of exchanged or pre-stored
public key certificates of the respective communication partner. However, in order to
ensure trust in public keys from the respective communication partner, a PKI is re-
quired [41]. With a PKI and certificates in place, the modified STS protocol becomes
a good candidate for mutual authentication and key agreement for LDACS.
STS-MAKE Protocol Run
The LDACS STS-MAKE protocol is illustrated in figure 1.10 and discussed in detail
below. The protocol has 5 steps:
Step 1 – Start of STS: After cell entry is done, and the DCH of LDACS is open
for authentication purposes, the GSC chooses a secret x and calculates its Diffie-
Hellman public key tGSC = gx.
Step 2 – Server Hello Key Exchange: The GSC sends the ServerHelloKeyEx-
change message to the AS. The AS chooses a secret y and calculates its Diffie-
Hellman public key tAS. It then calculates the static Diffie-Hellman shared key
SAS,GSC = (gx)y mod p and the shared session key KAS,GSC = KDF(SAS,GSC) via
a predefined Key Derivation Function (KDF) and creates its own signature
SigAS(tAS, tGSC, IDAS, IDGSC).
Step 3 – Client Hello Key Exchange: The AS sends now its Diffie-Hellman
public key tAS and its signature to the GSC in the ClientHelloKeyExchange message.
The GSC verifies the AS signature SigAS(tAS, tGSC, IDAS, IDGSC). If that verification
passes, at this point the AS is authenticated to the GSC. The GSC proceeds to gen-
erate SAS,GSC = (gy)y mod p and KAS,GSC = KDF(SAS,GSC) via a predefined KDF.
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Ground Station Controller (GSC) Ground Station (GS) Aircraft Station (AS)
Has: IDAS, IDGS, GSC certificate: Cert(GSC), Has: IDAS, IDGS, AS certificate: Cert(AS),
Public AS key: PubKeyAS Public GSC key: PubKeyGSC
Agreed upon: g, KDF, Signature scheme: Sigparty(data), Agreed upon: g, KDF, Signature scheme: Sigparty(data),
Symmetric encryption scheme: {data}key Symmetric encryption scheme: {data}key
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DCH open for authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 1 :
Start STS
Choose secret x
Calculate tGSC = gx mod p
Step 2 :
ServerHelloKeyExchange
|tGSC|
Forward
ServerHelloKeyExchange
Choose secret y
Calculate tAS = gy mod p
Calculate SAS,GSC with y and tGSC = gx
SAS,GSC = (gx)y mod p
Generate KAS,GSC = KDF(SAS,GSC)
Build SigAS(tAS, tGSC, IDAS, IDGSC)
Step 3 :
ClientHelloKeyExchange
|tAS|SigAS(tAS, tGSC, IDAS, IDGSC)|
Forward
ClientHelloKeyExchange
Verify SigAS(tAS, tGSC, IDAS, IDGSC)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AS authenticated to GSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
If correct: Finish STS
Calculate SAS,GSC with x and tAS = gy
SAS,GSC = (gy)x mod p
Generate KAS,GSC = KDF(SAS,GSC), NGSC
Build SigGSC(NGSC, tGSC, tAS, IDGSC, IDAS)
Step 4 :
ServerKeyExchangeFinished
|NGSC|SigGSC(NGSC, tGSC, tAS, IDGSC, IDAS)|
Forward
ServerKeyExchangeFinished
Verify SigGSC(NGSC, tGSC, tAS, IDGSC, IDAS)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GSC authenticated to AS→ AS and GSC mutually authenticated and sharing a master secret KAS,GSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 5 : Encrypt NGSC: {NGSC}KAS,GSC
ClientKeyExchangeFinished
{NGSC}KAS,GSC
Forward
ClientKeyExchangeFinished
Decrypt NGSC: {NGSC}KAS,GSC
Verify NGSC
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Key confirmation done, Secure communication AS-GSC with KAS,GSC can commence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 1.10: LDACS STS-MAKE Protocol [46]
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Now both parties have a shared session key KAS,GSC. It then builds another signature
tag SigGSC(NGSC, tGSC, tAS, IDGSC, IDAS).
Step 4 – Server Key Exchange Finished: The GSC sends its nonce NGSC and
signature SigGSC(NGSC, tGSC, tAS, IDGSC, IDAS) in the ServerKeyExchangeFinished mes-
sage to the AS. There the AS verifies the GSC signature
SigGSC(NGSC, tGSC, tAS, IDGSC, IDAS). If that verification passes, at this point the GSC
is authenticated to the AS.
Step 5 – Client Key Exchange Finished: To attain key confirmation, the AS
encrypts the nonce NGSC, {NGSC}KAS,GSC and sends that in the ClientKeyExchangeFin-
ished message to the GSC. At the GSC, the NGSC nonce is decrypted and verified. If
that verification step is successful, key confirmation of the key KAS,GSC is achieved.
Choice of Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) Type and Message Sizes
Currently, three different DHKE approaches are considered for the STS-MAKE pro-
cedure: Classic, ephemeral DHKE, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellmann (ECDH) and Su-
persingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman (SIDH). The original DHKE was first published
in 1976 and is based on the discrete logarithm or Diffie-Hellman problem [47]. Given
a cyclic group G of prime order n, a generator g of G and elements gx,gy ∈ G, find
gxy. Due to the possibility of Man-in-the-Middle attacks [48], authenticated DHKE
schemes (e.g., STS, Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) and IKE version 2 (IKEv2)
protocols [45] were invented.
Elliptic curve cryptography [49] enabled smaller key sizes, resulting in the the
ECDH protocol [50]. Based on the conjectured difficulty of finding isogenies be-
tween supersingular elliptic curves [51], SIDH finally represents a post-quantum
robust version of the DHKE [52, 53].
We define data sizes for the authentication and key agreement messages here for
the STS for LDACS protocol. For signatures lengths, we assume a total length of
64 Byte for a message signature, produced by current signature procedures such as
EdDSA-Ed25519 [54] or even post-quantum procedures such as rainbow [55].
All messages have a header consisting of TY PE, ID, UA and PRIO fields.
TY PE is a 4 Bit long field and clarifies the message type, ID is 12 Bit long and
denotes the ID of that message, UA is the 28 Bit long Unique Address field, con-
taining the LDACS specific addresses of AS and GS and finally the 4 Bit long PRIO
field signifies the priority this particular message has. We collect all these fields
into the header resulting in a 48 Bit length. A nonce N is of length 96 Bit. tGSC
and tAS are the Diffie-Hellman public keys of the respective entities and have dif-
ferent sizes, depending on the choice of the Diffie-Hellman procedure. The sizes
for the Diffie-Hellman public key of the GSC tGSC are: {DHKE = 3072|ECDH =
256|SIDH = 2624}. The sizes for the Diffie-Hellman public key of the AS tAS are:
{DHKE = 3072|ECDH = 256|SIDH = 2640}.
The ServerHelloKeyExchange message, responsible to initiate the STS protocol
between AS and GSC consists of the header and the Diffie-Hellman public key of
the GSC tGSC. Depending on the size of the public keys, the sizes for the Server-
HelloKeyExchange are {3120,304,2672} Bit. The key exchange message AS to
GSC is denoted as ClientHelloKeyExchange and consists of the header, the Diffie-
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Hellman public key of the AS tAS and an AS signature SigAS. Depending on the
size of the Diffie-Hellman public keys, the sizes for ClientHelloKeyExchange are
{3632,816,3200} Bit.
Table 1.2: Message sizes for STS-MAKE in bit
Message STS-DHKE STS-ECDH STS-SIDH
Step 2 3120 304 2672
Step 3 3632 816 3200
Step 4 656 656 656
Step 5 144 144 144
Total 7552 1920 6672
The ServerKey Ex-
changeFinished consists
of the header, a nonce
NGSC, and a GSC sig-
nature SigGSC, totalling
in 652 Bit. Finally
the ClientKeyExchange-
Finished finishes the pro-
tocol and simply con-
tains a header and the
encrypted nonce NGSC,
resulting in 144 Bit. Overall this leads to a total amount of authentication bits shown
in Table 1.2.
Please note, the STS-MAKE for LDACS was proven to fulfill the three objec-
tives for LDACS MAKE protocols, mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, using
the model checker Tamarin [56].
1.4.3.2 Physical Unclonable Function based Mutual Authentication
and Key Exchange (PMAKE)
As mentioned in Section 1.4.2, due to several reasons, PKI based MAKE protocols
might hold several disadvantages due to the political reality in aviation, that is, a
small number of dominant state actors are capable of securing critical infrastructure
and have limited trust towards others.
To address this problem, we proposed the use PUFs within LDACS radios to
generate device unique CRPs, used in PMAKE for mutual authentication. PUFs use
device unique random patterns, which are introduced in the manufacturing process
to differentiate chips and make them uniquely identifiable. In other words, a PUF
can be interpreted as a unique device’s fingerprint, an enabler to create a unique set
of cr pairs and a strong random number generator.
PMAKE Protocol Run
Instead of the establishment of a PKI, (1) very mobile node (aircraft) has to be
equipped with a PUF during the construction process of the specific LDACS radio
device and (2) an initial CRP has to be exchanged between aircraft and ground based
secure verification database in a secure environment. At the end of this initial ex-
change, the secure database within the GSC securely stores the CRP <CAS0 ,RAS0 >
and the AS stores <CAS0 >. The main part of the protocol is depicted in Fig. 1.11.
Step 1: The AS, upon receiving such a beacon, generates a random number
rAS and depending on the respectively chosen DHKE procedure, it calculates tAS and
α = HMACRAS0 (IDAS, IDGS, tAS). It then responds with |tAS⊕CAS0 |α|IDAS|.
Step 2:Once the GS receives the response to the beacon message, it appends its
ID to the message and forwards |tAS⊕CAS0 |α|IDAS|IDGS| to the GSC.
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Table 1.3 Notations used in the PMAKE scheme
Notation Definition
msg1 ⊕ msg2 XOR operation on msg1 with msg2
msg1 | msg2 Concatenation operation on msg1 with msg2
PUFA Physical Unclonable Function of entity A
HMACK(msg) Hash-based Message Authentication Code
with key K and input data msg
HKDF(K) HMAC Key Derivation Function (HKDF)
with input K
CAi i-th Challenge for PUF from entity A
RAi i-th Response from PUF from entity A
IDA Identifier of entity A
rA Random integers of entity A
”Ephemeral private key”
tA Ephemeral public key of entity A
g Public Diffie-Hellman parameters
SAS,GSC Static Diffie-Hellman key shared between
AS and GSC
KAS,GSC Session key for AS-GSC communications
{msg}K Symmetric encryption of data msg with key K
NA Nonce of entitiy A
Step 3: With the help of the previously stored tuple < CAS0 ,RAS0 >, the GSC
can compute the Diffie-Hellman public key of the AS tAS = tAS⊕CAS0 ⊕CAS0 and
α ′ = HMACRAS0 (IDAS, IDGS, tAS). It then checks whether α
′ == α match. If that is
the case, the AS has authenticated to the GSC. Then the GSC generates a random
number rGSC of its own and again in dependence on the previously agreed DHKE
procedure, calculates tGSC. Now the shared AS-GSC key SAS,GSC can be calculated
via the secret of the GSC rGSC and the Diffie-Hellman public key of the AS tAS. With
that, the GSC calculates the session key KAS,GSC via the HKDF and SAS,GSC. Finally
a new challenge CAS1 is chosen by the GSC and two new MAC tags are calculated.
β is used to conceal CAS1 , while γ serves as authenticity proof about the GSC for the
AS. It finally sends |β ⊕CAS1 |tGSC⊕ tAS|γ|IDGSC| to the GS.
Step 4: The GS forwards that message to the AS.
Step 5: First the AS calculates the Diffie-Hellman public key of the GSC via
tGSC = tGSC⊕ tAS⊕ tAS. To be able to decipher CAS1 , β ′ is calculated by the AS by
reconstructing RAS0 and using previously established values tGSC, tAS, IDGSC, IDGS,
IDAS. As CAS1 = β ⊕CAS1⊕β ′ the AS successfully received the new challenge CAS1 .
It then calculates its own value for γ ′ = HMACRAS0 (CAS1) and compares γ
′ = γ . If
they match, the GSC has authenticated to the AS. Furthermore the verifiable integrity
and return of tAS proves to the AS, that the GSC actually participated in the protocol.
Now the AS calculates the shared key SAS,GSC with rAS and tGSC and derives the
session key KAS,GSC = HKDF(SAS,GSC). Via the AS PUF a new response RAS1 is
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Ground Station Controller (GSC) Ground Station (GS) Aircraft Station (AS)
Has: IDAS, IDGS,<CAS0 ,RAS0 > Has: IDGS, IDGSC,<CAS0 >,PUFAS
Agreed upon: HMAC,HKDF,g,Symmetric encryption scheme:{data}key Agreed upon: HMAC,HKDF,g,Symmetric encryption scheme:{data}key
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DCH open for authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Step 1 :
Generate: rAS, Calculate: tAS, Generate: CAS0 → PUFAS → RAS0
Calculate: α = HMACRAS0 (IDAS, IDGS, tAS)
ClientHelloKeyExchange
|tAS⊕CAS0 |α|
Step 2 :
ClientHelloKeyExchange
|tAS⊕CAS0 |α|
Step 3 :
Calculate: tAS = tAS⊕CAS0 ⊕CAS0
Calculate: α ′ = HMACRAS0 (IDAS, IDGS, tAS)
Verify: α ′ == α , If match then AS is authentic
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AS authenticated to GSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Generate: rGSC , Calculate: tGSC
Calculate shared key: SAS,GSC with rGSC and tAS
Derive session key: KAS,GSC = HKDF(SAS,GSC)
Generate: CAS1
Calculate: β = HMACRAS0 (IDGSC, IDGS, IDAS, tGSC, tAS)
Calculate: γ = HMACRAS0 (CAS1 )
ServerHelloKeyExchange
|β ⊕CAS1 |tGSC⊕ tAS|γ|
Step 4 :
ServerHelloKeyExchange
F|β ⊕CAS1 |tGSC⊕ tAS|γ|
Step 5 :
Calculate: tGSC = tGSC⊕ tAS⊕ tAS
Calculate: β ′ = HMACRAS0 (IDGSC, IDGS, IDAS, tGSC, tAS)
Calculate: CAS1 = β ⊕CAS1 ⊕β ′, Calculate: γ ′ = HMACRAS0 (CAS1 )
Verify: γ ′ == γ , If match then GSC is authentic
Calculate shared key: SAS,GSC with rAS and tGSC
Derive session key: KAS,GSC = HKDF(SAS,GSC)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GSC authenticated to AS→ AS and GSC mutually authenticated and sharing a session key KAS,GSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Generate: CAS1 → PUFAS → RAS1
Calculate: δ = HMACRAS1 (IDAS, IDGS, IDGSC, tAS, tGSC)
Calculate: ε =CAS1 ⊕RAS1
Generate: NAS
Store: <CAS1 >, Erase from device: < RAS1 >
ClientKeyExchangeFinished
|NAS|{δ |ε}KAS,GSC |
Step 6 :
ClientKeyExchangeFinished
|NAS|{δ |ε}KAS,GSC |
Step 7 :
Decrypt: {δ |ε}KAS,GSC
Calculate: RAS1 =CAS1 ⊕ ε
Calculate: δ ′ = HMACRAS1 (IDAS, IDGS, IDGSC, tAS, tGSC)
Verify: δ ′ == δ , If match update new CRP: <CAS1 ,RAS1 >
Encrypt: {NAS}KAS,GSC
ServerKeyExchangeFinished
|{NAS}KAS,GSC |
Step 8 :
ServerKeyExchangeFinished
|{NAS}KAS,GSC |
Step 9 :
Decrypt: N′AS = {NAS}KAS,GSC
Verify N′AS == NAS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Key confirmation done, Secure communication AS-GSC with KAS−GSC can commence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 1.11: PMAKE protocol [57]
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generated to the new challenge CAS1 via CAS1 → PUFAS → RAS1 . It then calculates
δ = HMACRAS1 (IDAS, IDGS, IDGSC, tAS, tGSC) that will be used by the GSC as proof
for the authenticity and correctness of the new response RAS1 . ε =CAS1⊕RAS1 is used
to conceal the response RAS1 during transport. For key confirmation purposes, the AS
generates a nonce NAS. At this point, the AS securely stores CAS1 and erases RAS1
from memory. As AS and GSC have previously agreed upon suitable encryption
algorithms, the AS sends NAS in the clear and δ and ε encrypted with KAS,GSC back
to the GSC.
Step 6: The GS forwards that message to the GSC.
Step 7: The GSC decrypts the message with the agreed upon encryption al-
gorithm and key KAS,GSC. It then computes RAS1 = CAS1 ⊕ ε . It then calculates
δ ′ = HMACRAS1 (IDAS, IDGS, IDGSC, tAS, tGSC) and checks whether δ
′ == δ . If that
is the case, the GSC can be sure of the authenticity of the response RAS1 and the
participation of AS in the protocol. It updates the current tuple for that AS to
<CAS1 ,RAS1 >. It then encrypts NAS and sends it back to the AS.
Step 8: The GS forwards that message to the AS.
Step 9: Finally the AS decrypts N′AS = {NAS}KAS,GSC and compares N′AS == NAS.
If they match, AS is assured that GSC also holds the shared key, key confirmation
was successful and user data communication can commence.
PMAKE Data Overhead
Again, in analogy to the previous description of message sizes for STS-MAKE, we
assign amounts of bits to the different messages.
Table 1.4 Message sizes for PMAKE in bit
Message PMAKE-DHKE PMAKE-ECDH PMAKE-SIDH
Step 1 3276 460 2844
Step 3 3404 588 2956
Step 5 400 400 400
Step 7 144 144 144
Total 7224 1592 6344
We assume the same sizes as before, so header = 48 Bit, all IDs = 28 Bit,
nonces NAS = 96 Bit, MAC tag (c.f., α,β ,γ,δ ,ε)= 128 Bit, Diffie-Hellman public
key sizes for tGSC: {DHKE = 3072|ECDH = 256|SIDH = 2624}, Diffie-Hellman
public key sizes for tAS: {DHKE = 3072|ECDH = 256|SIDH = 2640}. We show
all PMAKE message sizes in Table 1.4.
1.4.4 Key Derivation
One all parties within the network have successfully authenticated to each other, key
derivation is necessary to generate different keys for different purposes. For example,
we need keys for user data protection and keys for control data protection.
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HKDF
As shown in Fig. 1.10 and Fig.1.11, we use the HKDF, a KDF built from Hash-
based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC). It uses the ”extract-then-expand”
paradigm, meaning that it consists of two main phases.
First the input keying material (here: master key/static Diffie Hellman shared
key) is taken and a fixed-length pseudo-random key is extracted. The extract phase
is especially important, if the master key is not sufficiently uniform (e.g. the key is
uniform only in a subset of the original key space). In that case, we extract a pseudo
random key from the master key by adding a salt value, which can be any fixed
non-secret string chosen at random. In the process the pseudo random key becomes
indistinguishable from a uniform distribution of bits. In general, HKDF can be used
with or without salt value, both variations work, however the use of salt significantly
increase the strength of HKDF. Salt ensures independence between different uses
of the hash function, supports ”source-independent” extraction, and strengthens the
analytical results that back the HKDF design [58].
User Data Protection Keys
Also depending on the algorithm choice for securing user data on the datalink, we
need either one symmetric key (e.g., for AES-GCM [59], which allows integrity and
confidentiality protection) or two symmetric keys for integrity and confidentiality
protection.
Control Data Protection Keys
As discussed before in Section 1.2.6, securing the control plane of LDACS proves
more difficult than its user plane. The underlying problems are very small chunks
of data (e.g., RL DCCH: 83 Bit) and the need that every aicraft within one LDACS
cell can read the entire control data plane of LDACS. Thus using individual AS
specific keys for securing the CCCH, DCCH channels is not possible. We do not put
additional cryptographic protection on the Random Access Control Channel (RACH)
or bcch¸ , as if any spoofer or attacker sending information within those data links is
detected and filtered out during the MAKE procedure of LDACS. As the data on
the DCCH is mainly responsible to enable an AS to request data allocations, such
that it can send user data and the CCCH being the logical channel, via which those
resources are granted, integrity protection of these is most important to prevent any
attacker redistributing LDACS resources.
The only possible way to meet all these requirements, is via introducing group
key mechanisms for LDACS. We are currently investigating and comparing the suit-
ability of the Group-IKEv2 [60], Chinese Remainder Group Key (CRGK) [61], Cen-
tral Authorized Key Extension (CAKE) [62] and Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) pro-
tocol [63] for LDACS. This process is ongoing work and has not concluded yet.
1.4.5 User Data Security
After the MAKE procedure and with the key derivation of user keys, the user data
plane of LDACS can be secured.
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We propose to secure LDACS SN-PDUs, thus Packet Data Uni (PDU)s on the
SNP, as their size can vary from 128 to 1536 Byte [29], which makes them possibly
the largest PDUs within LDACS. This helps minimizing security data overhead, in
case a Message Authentication Code (MAC) tag is attached to the SN-PDU.
Confidentiality Protection
We suggest using symmetric approaches for data encryption, due to low computa-
tional overhead and fast operation times. We propose to establish end-to-end encryp-
tion for e.g., Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) data between GSC and AS.
After extensive discussion with representatives of ATC instances, it became appar-
ent, that ATS data will probably not be encrypted, as every air traffic controller op-
erating in the area should be able to read that data for safety reasons. Thus, between
layer 3 and the LDACS sublayer, some notification of the content of the packet will
be necessary. As encryption algorithm, we recommend AES-256-GCM [59] with
Galois Counter Mode (GCM) being a mode of operation on symmetric key block.
It provides authenticated encryption and decryption operations and it proves robust
against currently known quantum-computer-based algorithms [64]. The last prop-
erty is important, as due to the long service life of aeronautical communications, this
rising threat might become dangerous during its life cycle.
Integrity Protection
All user data, sent via LDACS, requires some kind of integrity protection mecha-
nism. We propose two mutually exclusive strategies:
AES-GCM Galois Counter Mode is a mode of operation for symmetric key
cryptographic block ciphers (i.e., here: AES). It supports two operations: authen-
ticated encryption and decryption. If only message authentication is required, the
variation Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) can be used. After the ap-
plication of this operation mode, we are left with a ciphertext C of exactly the same
length as the plaintext P and an authentication tag T of 128 Bit length. However
[65] defines tag sizes of 128, 120, 112, 104, or 96, 64 and 32 Bit length, with a clear
recommendation to use 96 Bit or more.
HMAC Here, the idea is to combine the Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC) message authentication mechanism [66] and combine it with hash-
functions from the SHA-3 hash-family [67]. We propose HMAC-SHA3-128, that
way, we are left with a plaintext P and a message tag T of 128 Bit length.
1.4.6 Control Data Security
As described in depth in Section 1.4.4, securing the control data plane of LDACS
proves to be far more complicated than its user plane. Reasons for this are far smaller
message sizes (c.f., DC: 83 Bit, CC: 728 Bit), the need, that every participant within
an LDACS cell need to be able to (1) read its contents and (2) be assured of their
authenticity.
That way, it is clear, that we need control data integrity and not necessarily
confidentiality. This leaves us with the problem, that a simple message tag simply
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does not fit in the small control messages. Even if we shrink the tag size to e.g.,
32 Bit, radically reducing the security level, the capacity of LDACS would be also
reduced drastically, as fewer resources could be requested and allocated, due to the
reduced configuration data space left within the messages.
Securing FL control plane data is easier than its RL counterpart, as the GS can
send a continuous stream of OFDM symbols on the FL and is thus the only entity
putting data on the CCCH. Assuming a group key has been negotiated within the
group of one GS and all AS within that particular LDACS cell, that key can be used
by the GS to add a small message tag to a CC-PDU. Assuming a 64 Bit tag to be
sufficiently secure, this still results in a 64/728 = 8,8% overhead.
On the other direction, every AS requests resources on the DCCH, thus every
aircraft contributes DC-PDUs and every one is 83 Bit long. With that size, and given
that only 8 Bit are currently reserved for padding [29], applying a message tag per
DC-PDU is impossible.
This topic, altogether with the investigation of group key procedure for LDACS
is currently ongoing and will have to be solved before the LDACS security architec-
ture can be finalized.
1.4.7 Changes within the LDACS Protocol Stack
At the beginning of that chapter, we discussed placement of security functionality
within the LDACS protocol stack. After having described the entire process of how
trust is handled, options for entity authentication and key exchange, key derivation,
user data and control data protection, we want to assign all these tasks to certain
entities within the LDACS protocol stack.
In Fig. 1.12, we have added security relevant states and functionality, marked
in red, within the LDACS protocol stack. As said at the beginning of this chapter,
LME and SNP are the two most important, security related entities. The LME han-
dles the entire connection establishment and now MAKE procedure, together with
key negotiation, derivation, handover and secure logging. It is also responsible for
protecting control channel data. The SNP, after the MAKE procedure is over and it
has received the user data session key from the LME handles user data protection.
Also one important factor are the CoS of LDACS: After initial connection es-
tablishment and during the MAKE procedure, the DLS and SNP only allow packets
of the highest priority (i.e., CoS=7) to pass through to the LME for authentication
purposes. No other data packet is able to pass through, before the LME has not suc-
cessfully completed the entire MAKE procedure, with session keys being deployed
at LME for control data protection and SNP for user data protection.
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Figure 1.12: Security related changes within the LDACS protocol stack
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1.5 Evaluation of the LDACS Cybersecurity Architecture
The cybersecurity measures of LDACS were evaluated in [11, 68, 46, 57]. Here we
want to present evaluations (1) in a theoretical model for LDACS security data and
latency overhead, (2) modelled in an event based simulation framework Framework
for Aeronautical Communications and Traffic Simulations 2 (FACTS) and (3) actual
flight trials.
1.5.1 Theoretical Model for LDACS Security Latency Overhead
In 2015, Gräupl et al. [69] presented a full methodology on how to emulate latencies
for user data in the forward and reverse link of LDACS depending on the Bit Error
Rate (BER) and message size.
Taking re-transmissions into account, the FL latency can be calculated with
LFL(t) = mFL(t)+(1+δRX (1+n))×dMF (1.1)
and the RL latency with
LRL(t) = mRL(t)+(2+δRX (N +3))×dMF . (1.2)
Table 1.5 Parameter values for latency timing for the LDACS MAC protocol [46]
Forward Link Model (Eq. 1.1) Reverse Link Model (Eq. 1.2)
Parameters Values Parameters Values
dMF 60ms dMF 60ms
mFL(t) Time until start mRL(t) Average time until start
of next FL MF: of next MAC cycle:
Every 1 to 60ms #AS/32×dMF +wait
modelled by U(1,60) wait modelled by U(1,60)
n Average amount of N Average amount of MFs
MF after transmission after transmission
until next DC slot is until next DC slot
scheduled for AS is scheduled for AS:
in MAC-cycle: N = (#AS/32−3)
n = #AS/32 mod #AS/32
BER 10−6,10−5
P P({no error in packet}) = (1−BER)l
P({error in packet}) = 1− ((1−BER)l)
In Equation 1.1, we use mFL(t) to classify the time until the start of the next
CC frame, δRX ∈ {0,1} to indicate a re-transmission, dMF denotes the length of a
MF and n is derived from the length of the reverse link medium access cycle from
forward link perspective.
In Equation 1.2, we use mRL(t) to denote the time until the start of next DC slot,
δRX ∈ {0,1} to indicate a re-transmission, dMF denotes the length of a MF and N is
derived from the length of the reverse link medium access cycle from reverse link
perspective.
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We model δRX ∈ {0,1} as stochastic process, based on the packet error rate.
Given a BER, we can calculate the packet error rate based on the length of a packet l:
P({no error in packet}) = (1−BER)l . Thus the opposite event, that a packet indeed
contains an error is: P({error in packet}) = 1− ((1−BER)l). These two probability
decide the value of δRX , whether a re-transmission is necessary and, thus, an error
appeared in the packet, or not.
For more details on the model, please refer to [69] and [46].
With these equations, we calculate LDACS authentication latencies based on the
amount of AS within an LDACS cell. We see these results in Fig. 1.13.
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Figure 1.13: Authentication baseline latency at BER = 0 vs. authentication latency
at worst case scenario of BER = 10−5.
Please note that due to the similar message sizes, PMAKE and STS-MAKE
have almost equal authentication latencies. Both authentication procedures finish
quicker with smaller message sizes at higher BER, thus ECDH finishes faster than
SIDH, which in turn finishes faster than DHKE. The requirements document DO-
350A imposes a RCT PCSP = 10s threshold for RCP 130/A1 message types [70],
meaning that all authentication and connection establishment must be completed
below the 10s threshold [29]. As we clearly see in Fig. 1.13, we always remain
below this threshold, even when an LDACS cell is full.
1.5.2 Model within FACTS2 Simulation Framework
Another important way of evaluating changes within the LDACS protocol is rapid
prototyping with software based simulations. FACTS [71] is a simulation framework
based on modern, service-oriented software architecture: Simulation services orga-
nized in a parallelized toolchain of loosely coupled software services split by the
separation of concerns. It allows for the simulation of infrastructure, generation of
aeronautical data traffic, simulation of flight patterns or parsing of real-world flight
patterns, simulation of arbitrary aeronautical data links and protocols and more. Ev-
ery tool is tasked with one task (e.g., simulating the LDACS datalink) and multiple
tools can be piped together, using Unix pipes on the command line. In Fig. 1.14, we
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see first worldwide air traffic movement, then FACTS simulates realistic air traffic
data, simulates LDACS as underlying datalink and outputs a report on the perfor-
mance of the datalink.
(a) Graphical output of worldwide air traffic (b) Output of LDACS measurement report
Figure 1.14: Two important capabilities of FACTS: (1) visual output of air traffic
movement (2) measurement reports on the performance of tested datalinks [71]
In [68], we used FACTS to demonstrate a proof of concept of the user data
security architectural concept of LDACS. Results proved, that the implementation
concept with the ”auth” state within protocol entities and different classes of ser-
vice, with the highest priority class reserved for authentication purposes, works as
intended. Thus authentication, key exchange, derivation and handover were per-
formed and SN-PDUs could be secured via the AES-256-GCM algorithm and the
negotiated, shared session keys as described in Section 1.4.7.
1.5.3 Real World Demonstration of LDACS Security Features
Lastly, during the German national project Migration towards COm/NAV capabili-
ties of LDACS (MICONAV) in March/April 2019, we could demonstrate some secu-
rity features of LDACS in the worldwide first LDACS flight trials. Fig. 1.15 shows
the research aircraft used in the flight trials, a Falcon 20-E5, together with the posi-
tion of the L-band antenna.
AS L-band Antenna Position 
Figure 1.15: DLR’s research aircraft Falcon 20-E5 (D-CMET) [36]
In Fig.1.16a and in Fig. 1.16b, we show the LDACS GS demonstration setup
and in Fig. 1.16c the AS LDACS demonstration equivalent.
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Figure 1.16: Overview of airborne and ground LDACS equipment [36]
With pre-installed certificates at the AS and GS, we demonstrated a key en-
capsulation procedure based on the post-quantum robust public-key cryptosystem
McEliece [72]. Using this negotiated session key as a result, we encrypted any ac-
tual data, such as text messages, CPDLC messages, ADS-C messages for AS po-
sitioning with the aforementioned AES-256-GCM symmetric cryptosystem. With
data gained during the actual flight, we can confirm, that the chosen MAKE proce-
dure itself remained below the required RCT PCSP = 10s threshold for RCP 130/A1
message types [70]. Overall we performed 19 key exchanges and observed a mean
key exchange time of 508.15 ms and a 95-percentile of 513.13 ms. This matches the
values presented in Fig. 1.13 with just one AS in an LDACS cell very well and is a
strong indicator for the accuracy of the theoretical model and the FACTS simulation.
Figure 1.17: Console output during after successful key exchange. All further com-
munication afterwards was secured using AES-256-GCM.
In Fig. 1.17, we see the console output of a successful key exchange and with se-
cured communications channel opened, aboard the Falcon 20-E5 during MICONAV.
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1.6 Conclusion
This work presents a summary of the design of the LDACS cybersecurity concept.
We introduce the FCI and the current state of cybersecurity in digital aeronautical
communications, which is that especially on legacy datalinks (i.e., ADS-B, VDLm2)
there is no information security based on the definitions from the internet security
glossary RFC 4949. We continue with a presentation of relevant technical details
about LDACS and then with a threat- and risk analysis, defining security require-
ments, objectives and functions. We start the section on the LDACS cybersecurity
architecture with different trust approaches, a PKI and a PUF CRP based, then con-
tinue with two MAKE procedure based on these trust solutions. We propose the use
of AES-GCM for user data protection, and state out reasons, why integrity is more
important than confidentiality. On the security for control plane data, we are in-
vestigating the use of group-key procedure, however this is still a work in progress.
Finally we finish with a compete integration of the security additions within the
LDACS protocol stack. In the evaluation, we show, that both MAKE procedures
finish far below the required latency threshold and only put up to 1 kB of additional
security data on the link. Also via analytical evaluation, a software event-based sim-
ulation, and flight trials, we present a first proof-of-concept of LDACS cybersecurity.
Future work aims to solve the open problem of control channel security of
LDACS by investigating different group key procedures and different approaches
on guaranteeing integrity of control data. Also proving the semantic correctness
and soundness of LDACS protocol security with model checkers such as Tamarin,
Scyther or ProVerif is an important step in the validation of LDACS cybersecurity
features. Finally, further flight trials are planned for 2022, where the entire cyberse-
curity concept can be validated in flight trials on more advanced LDACS prototype
hardware.
All candidates within the FCI require strong cybersecurity features. We agree
with this requirement as we strongly believe, cybersecurity is the enabler in the future
automation of civil air traffic. As LDACS is the worldwide first truly integrated CNS
system, and thus an important part of the digitization process, this work on cyberse-
curity for LDACS is an essential pillar for the final standardization and deployment
of LDACS.
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Abbreviations
A2A Air-to-Air
AC-R Access-Router
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
ADS-C Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Contract
AeroMACS Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System
ANI Airborne Network Interface
ANSP Aeronautical Network Service Provider
AOC Aeronautical Operational Control
APT Airport
AS Aircraft Station
ATC Air Traffic Communications
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATN Aeronautical Telecommunications Network
ATS Air Traffic Services
AVI Airborne Voice Interface
BC Broadcast Channel
BER Bit Error Rate
CA Certificate Authority
CC Common Control
CCCH Common Control Channel
CNS Communication, Navigation and Surveillance
CoS Classes of Service
CPDLC Controller–Pilot Data Link Communications
CRP Challenge-Response Pair
CSMA Carrier Sense Multiple Access
D8PSK Differential 8 Phase Shift Keying
DC Dedicated Control
DCCH Dedicated Control Channel
DCH Data Channel
DHKE Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
DLS Data Link Service
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellmann
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FACTS Framework for Aeronautical Communications and Traffic Simulations 2
FCI Future Communications Infrastructure
FDD Frequency Division Duplexing
FL Flight Level
FL Foward Link
GBAS Ground Based Augmentation System
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
GS Ground Station
GSC Ground Station Controller
HKDF HMAC Key Derivation Function
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange
KDF Key Derivation Function
LDACS L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System
LLC Logical Link Control
LME LDACS Management Entity
MAC Medium Access Layer
MAKE Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange
MF Multi Frame
MICONAV Migration towards COm/NAV capabilities of LDACS
OFDM Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing
OFDMA Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access
ORP Oceanic Remote Polar
PDU Packet Data Uni
PHY Physical Layer
PHY-SDU Physical Layer-Service Data Unit
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PMAKE Physical Unclonable Function based Mutual Authentication and Key Ex-
change
PUF Physical Unclonable Function
QoS Quality of Service
RA Random Access
RACH Random Access Control Channel
RL Reverse Link
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SAC System Area Code
SARPS Standards and Recommended Practices
SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research
SF Super Frame
SIB System Identificaiton Broadcast
SIDH Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman
SNP Sub-Network Protocol
STS Station-to-Station
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access
TMA Terminal Maneuvering Area
VDLm2 VHF Data Link mode 2
VHF Very High Frequency
VI Voice Interface
VU Voice Unit
References
[1] IATA. Economic Performance of the Airline Industry. Interna-
tional Air Transport Association (IATA); 2020. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-
reports/airline-industry-economic-performance—november-2020—report/.
[2] ACI. Economic Performance of the Airline Industry. Air-
ports Council International (ACI); 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://store.aci.aero/product/annual-world-airport-traffic-report-2019/.
[3] Iacus SM, Natale F, Santamaria C, et al. Estimating and projecting air passen-
ger traffic during the COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak and its socio-economic
impact. Safety Science. 2020 September;129:104791. Available from:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753520301880.
[4] Slim M, Mahmoud B, Pirovano A, et al. Aeronautical Communication Tran-
sition From Analog to Digital Data: A Network Security Survey. Computer
Science Review. 2014 May;11-12:1–29.
[5] Schnell M, Epple U, Shutin D, et al. LDACS: Future Aeronautical Communi-
cations for Air-Traffic Management. IEEE Communication Magazine. 2014
May;52(5):104–110.
[6] Schnell M. Update on LDACS - The FCI Terrestrial Data Link. In: 19th In-
tegrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Conference (ICNS).
New York, NY, USA: IEEE; 2019. p. 1–10.
[7] Kamali B. AeroMACS: An IEEE 802.16 Standard-based Technology for the
Next Generation of Air Transportation Systems. John Wiley & Sons; 2018.
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